UDK fraud models may have yielded 135, 36 and 72 cases

AI system

System: Udbetaling Danmark / ATP Den Faelles Dataenhed fraud-control models (about 60 profiling and machine-learning models as of 2019, including 'Really Single', 'Model Abroad' and 'Fictitious Employment')
Model: Not assessed
Release: Not assessed
Application developer: ATP (Arbejdsmarkedets Tillaegspension) with NNIT A/S as supplier, for Udbetaling Danmark
Role: Not assessed
Configuration: Not assessed
Inputs and outputs: Not assessed
Autonomy: Not assessed
Workflow: Models examine linked public registers and flag recipients for review. A UDK/ATP team that handles about 5,000 to 6,000 cases a year screens the results and investigates selected cases. Around 1,800 of its annual cases come from the models.
Human oversight: Staff investigated the files and decided whether benefits should be reduced or stopped.
Relation to AI: The models select “requested cases” that UDK's HOK control team screens and investigates. Decisions to stop or reduce benefits are taken by humans after investigation. UDK measures model quality by the share of cases the team accepts for manual processing. Every outcome figure is a UDK statement (FOI responses and a letter) as reproduced verbatim in Amnesty International's report. No official publication of them is among the sources. Amnesty contests effectiveness and alleges discrimination risks, and UDK rejected parts of Amnesty's assessment. NNIT built the models to ATP's specifications. No developer-authored source is on record. The dm.dk report and ATP's page are not among the sources.
AI contribution: Udbetaling Danmark’s models selected benefit files for investigation. Staff screened the selections before deciding whether to investigate further.

Benefits

Outcome identifiers: Not assessed
Benefit: Udbetaling Danmark reported 135, 36, and 72 cases with benefits stopped or reduced through three controls in 2023.
Category: Reduced Risk
Status: Not assessed
Beneficiary groups: People. Organizations. Society.
Beneficiaries: Udbetaling Danmark is the intended institutional beneficiary. No individual beneficiary of the controls is identified.
Reach: No count of beneficiaries is established. The screened population is not a measure of people who benefited.
Distribution and access: Not assessed
Duration: Not assessed
Expected?: Yes
Costs and harms: Amnesty International alleges discrimination risks and disproportionate surveillance. Udbetaling Danmark disputed parts of its assessment.

Measurement

Studies: Not assessed
Study design: Not assessed
Measurement: Not assessed
Setting and sample: Not assessed
Measures: Cases requested, cases opened for investigation, and cases in which benefits were stopped or reduced.
Comparison: Not assessed
Results: The three controls reported 135, 36, and 72 cases with payments stopped or reduced in 2023. The same controls requested 412, 511, and 491 cases, but the agency cautions that the annual totals do not necessarily refer to the same cases.
Additional value from AI: Not assessed
Limitations: The outcome figures come from the agency’s letter reproduced by Amnesty. No monetary amounts or matched case cohorts are given. Amnesty disputes the controls’ effectiveness and necessity, while the agency rejected parts of that assessment.
Denominators: Not assessed
Materials for replication: Not assessed

Money

Kind of value: erroneous payments unveiled by UDK and municipal controls in 2017 and 2018; the source says it is unclear how much was recovered and that the figure includes averted future payments, and it does not isolate the models
Amount: half a billion Danish crowns (approximately 70 million euros)
Currency and prices: Not assessed
Period and unit: Not assessed
Realization: Not assessed
Recipients and payers: Udbetaling Danmark and the municipalities (the Danish public purse)
Gross or net: Not assessed
Included costs: Not assessed
Comparison: Not assessed
Method: Not assessed
Return and payback: Not assessed

People and places

Participants: Developer: ATP (Arbejdsmarkedets Tillaegspension) with NNIT A/S as supplier, for Udbetaling Danmark. Operator: Udbetaling Danmark (public authority), administered by ATP.
Jurisdictions: Benefit: Denmark (national). Developer: Denmark. Operator: Denmark.
Ownership and control: Not assessed
Dependencies: Not assessed
Cross-border connections: Not assessed
Geopolitical implications: Not assessed

Follow-up

Conditions for replication: Register access and model use need a lawful basis. Staff must investigate the flagged cases. The cited material does not provide evaluation measures that would establish how well the controls perform.
Replication attempts: 2 follow-up entries. Benefit recurred: 2.
Later findings: No later development in the controls is established. The employment minister forwarded a UDK board account to Parliament (Folketinget DIU Alm.del 2024-25 bilag 32), but its contents remain unverified.
Availability: Not assessed
Institutional decision: Not assessed
Grounds: Not assessed
Action and result: Not assessed
Success criterion: Not assessed

Evidence

Source numbers: AIBD-0336-source-0001–0009
Citations: Numbered references below.
Language: Not assessed
Source relationships: Independent, Operator
Original evidence: Not assessed
Access and versions: Not assessed
Supported findings: Not assessed
Evidence links: Not assessed
Evidence strength: Not assessed
Missing evidence: Not assessed

Grades

Assessed benefits: People. Organizations. Society.
Depth: People: Not assessed. Organizations: 1. Society: 1.
Reasons: The agency reports several hundred adjustments to benefits, without amounts or a matched comparison. Amnesty’s reading suggests that most opened investigations produced no further action. No individual benefit or wider improvement is established.
Observed or intended: Not assessed
Rubric: Not assessed
Assessor and date: Not assessed
Alternative assessments: Not assessed
Fill: Independently studied

Entry details

Kind: Not assessed
Related entries: Not assessed
Field: Public administration: social benefits fraud control. National welfare payments authority.
Purpose: Built to flag benefit recipients at elevated risk of receiving unentitled payments for manual control by UDK's control team. The recorded outcome, cases with benefits stopped or reduced, is that purpose.
Dates: Date basis unassessed: 2024 (precision unassessed). Updated: 25 October 2026.
Stage: Not assessed
Version: SHA-256: f17dd0570442…

References

Other identifiers: Not assessed
Category mappings: Not assessed
Brief: Not assessed
Revisions: 9 revisions. Latest: 25 October 2026.

Sources

Report Independent author

Amnesty International (2024). Coded Injustice: Surveillance and Discrimination in Denmark's Automated Welfare State (EUR 18/8709/2024), 12 Nov 2024, Table 5 'Statistics for data-driven controls used by UDK in 2023', p. 43.
Report Independent author

Amnesty International (2024). Coded Injustice, full report PDF, p. 30 (Fraud-control algorithms).
Report Independent author

Kayser-Bril, N. (2020). In a quest to optimize welfare management, Denmark built a surveillance behemoth. AlgorithmWatch, 6 Aug 2020.
Report Independent author

Alfter, B. (2020). Denmark chapter, section 'Controlling social welfare recipients'. In AlgorithmWatch and Bertelsmann Stiftung, Automating Society Report 2020.
News report Independent author

Amnesty International Algorithmic Accountability Lab (2024). How We Did It: Amnesty International's Investigation of Algorithms in Denmark's Welfare System. Global Investigative Journalism Network, 14 Nov 2024.
Press release Independent author

Amnesty International (2024). Denmark: AI-powered welfare system fuels mass surveillance and risks discriminating against marginalized groups – report. Press release, 12 Nov 2024.
Other Independent author

University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law (n.d.). Offentlig AI database entry 'Kontrol med udbetaling af ydelser' (Udbetaling Danmark; status: I brug; supplier NNIT A/S; about 60 models as of 2019).